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THE DETERMINANTS OF LEGAL DOUBT 
Frederick Schauer* 
THE CASE LA w SYSTEM IN AMERICA. By Karl N. Llewellyn. Edited 
by Paul Gewirtz. Translated from the German by Michael Ansaldi. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1989. Pp. xxxvii, 127. 
$24.95. 
Like The Bramble Bush, 1 Karl Llewellyn's Pra]udizienrecht und 
Rechtsprechung in Amerika2 was written not for the specialist but for 
the neophyte. But where The Bramble Bush was designed for the be-
ginning American law student, Pra]udizienrecht in Amerika was aimed 
at the German lawyer seeking to understand from a civil law back-
ground something about the American common law system. 3 And 
just as The Bramble Bush (and The Path of the Law thirty years ear-
lier4) was far richer theoretically than one would normally expect 
from an introduction for the novice, so too is Pra]udizienrecht in 
Amerika a work of much more theoretical interest and novelty than 
the standard discussion of the rudiments of American law aimed at 
non-American audiences. 
Pra]udizienrecht in Amerika is hardly an unknown work. Exten-
sively reviewed when published, 5 and discussed in much of the secon-
dary literature on Llewellyn in particular and Realism in general, 6 it is 
properly considered one of Llewellyn's major works. Still, because it 
was written and published only in German, it was until now largely 
inaccessible to most of those who are interested either in Legal Realist 
theory or in the development of Llewellyn's thought. 
With the publication of Michael Ansaldi's careful and fluid trans-
lation of Pra]udizienrecht in Amerika, this gap in the corpus of Llewel-
lyn in English has been filled. The book, published under the 
• Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University. -Ed. 
1. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930). 
2. K. LLEWELLYN, PRAJUDIZIENRECHT UND RECHTSPRECHUNG lN AMERIKA (1933). 
3. The book was based on a series oflectures delivered by Llewellyn in Leipzig, in 1928-1929. 
4. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897). 
5. A list of reviews is set out at p. x n.3. Two of them, Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 
U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934), and Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Priijudizienrecht 
in Amerika, 33 CoLUM. L. REV. 199 (1933), have become important parts of the literature in 
their own right. 
6. See w. TwlNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). Parts of 
the book had been translated into English by Dawson and included within J. DAWSON, COM-
PARATIVE LAW 187-200 (1951). 
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translated title, The Case Law System in America, and edited by Paul 
Gewirtz, should eliminate any excuse for students of Realism to ignore 
this important work, and should as well provide a useful synopsis of 
much of Llewellyn's thinking for those whose exposure might previ-
ously have consisted only of The Bramble Bush and isolated excerpts 
from The Common Law Tradition. 7 
The Case Law System in America, as befits its provenance as a se-
ries of lectures to a German audience, contains much that genuinely is 
only an introduction for the novice. Consequently, most American 
readers can skim with little fear of loss the various parts of this short 
book that deal with the structure of American courts (pp. 27-34), the 
nature of the citation system (pp. 16-22), and the technicalities of civil 
procedure (pp. 34-42). Much more of the book, however, is far re-
moved from simple factual exposition, and sets forth insightfully, cre-
atively, and controversially many distinctly Llewellynesque ideas 
about how the American system of common law decisionmaking actu-
ally operates. 
Perhaps the most important of these ideas, important precisely be-
cause it has been so little heeded, is Llewellyn's recurrent call for soci-
ological inquiry into the nature of legal decisionmaking (pp. 9-12, 89-
113). A sociological approach to legal decisionmaking stands in oppo-
sition to the now common normative mode of legal scholarship, in 
which prescribing desirable results to judges is the norm and every-
thing else the exception. By contrast, throughout this book, as in 
much of the rest of his work, Llewellyn urges those who wish to un-
derstand the legal system to assess externally and empirically the ac-
tual nature of judicial decisionmaking, and to do so systematically 
rather than anecdotally. As this book makes clear, it is undoubtedly 
Llewellyn's view that such inquiry would show the extent to which 
there are indeed patterns of dealing with precedent as well as predict-
able patterns of judicial decisionmaking. These patterns, however, di-
verge more often than not from those that might be perceived simply 
from a literal reading of judicial opinions. 
As Professor Gewirtz's introduction makes plain (pp. xvii-xxii), 
there is another dominant theme of this book: the continuing inter-
play between, on the one hand, a greater degree of judicial freedom in 
the use of precedents than classical legal theory would acknowledge 
and, on the other, the way in which a wide range of acculturating 
forces is likely to lead to that freedom being exercised by judges in 
largely parallel ways. The interplay of judicial freedom and accultur-
ating forces results in more constraint than an exclusive focus on judi-
7. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1; K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON - DE· 
CIDING APPEALS (1960). And surely the most commonly read part of the latter work is the 
article originally published as Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950). 
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cial freedom or leeway would acknowledge, and consequently more 
ability to predict judicial decisions than one who had assimilated only 
the crudest and most caricatured forms of Realism would expect. 
Llewellyn's focus, then, is on the recurring patterns of lawyerly behav-
ior, and on the degree of constraint and predictability that such recur-
ring patterns facilitate. This concern shows the extent to which 
Llewellyn was among the most moderate of the Realists. 
There can be little doubt that shared experiences bring shared per-
spectives. Because appellate judges are universally drawn from the 
ranks of practicing lawyers, and because practicing lawyers are almost 
universally characterized by having spent three years in American law 
schools more similar to each other than they are different, it should 
come as little surprise that the universe of appellate judg_es does not 
replicate in all respects the characteristics of the universe of human 
beings. Partly because of the internalization of professional norms of 
lawyering and judging, partly because such norms serve to create and 
reinforce a somewhat autonomou~ professional culture, 8 and partly be-
cause of the self-selection that leads some people to become lawyers 
and others not (to say nothing of the social forces that lead some peo-
ple to have the opportunity of becoming lawyers and others not), and 
some lawyers to become judges and others not (to say nothing of the 
social forces that lead some lawyers to have the opportunity of becom-
ing judges and others not9), the range of likely appellate judicial reac- · 
tions to a given problem is narrower than that of the population at 
large. Moreover, this narrowness is exacerbated by the way in which 
the methods, institutions, and structures of appellate decisionmaking 
themselves exercise a constraining force beyond that exercised by the 
similarity of perspective among the individuals inhabiting those 
institutions. 
Still, there is another story to be told, and it is one that Llewellyn 
consistently avoids. Just as lawyers share much in common, so too do 
they differ in psychological makeup, political perspective, personal 
background, and self-understanding of their role. Although Llewellyn 
pays lip service to these and other sources of difference, he continu-
ously focuses on the ways in which appellate judges see things simi-
larly rather than differently. 10 
8. See generally N. LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (E. King & M. Albrow 
trans. 1985). 
9. The parallel structure of the parentheticals should not be taken to be making a parallel 
statistical claim. To the contrary, it is quite possible that the opportunity to become a judge 
given that one is a lawyer is far greater than the opportunity to become a lawyer given that one is 
a resident of the United States. 
10. Jerome Frank, Llewellyn's contemporary, and many modem scholars do not ignore the 
existence of differences among judges or the effect of those differences. J. FRANK, LA w AND THE 
MODERN MIND (1930); see also M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES 45-51, 
103-07 (1987); Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986); Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate 
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The extent to which differences in background, social situation, 
psychological makeup, and political outlook make a difference in the 
outcome of judicial decisionmaking is likely to be a function of the size 
of the space within which judicial discretion operates. Here again 
Llewellyn's jurisprudential conservatism (which bears no necessary re-
lation to political conservatism) comes through, a conservatism even 
more apparent now than perhaps it was then. Foreshadowing the con-
temporary work of Priest and Klein and others, 11 Llewellyn notes in 
this book that "we may pretty safely say, almost every case on appeal 
to a court oflast resort could be decided just as easily, legally speak-
ing, for the plaintiff as for the defendant" (p. 8). This to Llewellyn is 
decidedly not a statement about the essentially indeterminate nature of 
legal reasoning. Rather, it is a statement about the incentives that lead 
some issues to be disputed and others not, some disputes to be tried 
and others not, and some trial court decisions to be appealed and 
others not. 
It is hard to get around this dilemma. If the proper outcome of the case 
were not really a matter of doubt, how is it that an honest, competent 
judge in the court of first instance could decide it "incorrectly"? Again, 
if the outcome of the case were not really in doubt, how is it that an 
honest, competent attorney could burden his client with the time and 
expense of an appeal if the trial court has rendered a "correct" judg-
ment? The very fact that there is an appeal usually proves that doubts 
exist among professionals, unless the attorney is using the appeal merely 
as a dilatory tactic. [p. 8] 
At this point in the argument Llewellyn appears agnostic about 
what it is that makes a case such that it could be decided, "just as 
easily, legally speaking, for the plaintiff as for the defendant" (p. 8). 
Throughout the book, however, he appears less agnostic, often expres-
sing views sympathetic to the position that rules with an "invariant 
wording" (p. 73) would with little doubt "encompass many cases" (p. 
73). "Insofar as these cases were known to the lawmaker before the 
rule was laid down, and insofar as circumstances have remained un-
. changed since that time, one can work with the rule deductively" (p. 
73). Only when "the possibility of doubt arises" (p. 73) does the situa-
tion become different. 
Similarly, Llewellyn claims that there are cases 
[such] that.no one has any doubt about how to handle [them], but that 
no one had in mind when the rule was created. Nonetheless anyone who 
looked at the case and the rule at the same time would "recognize" that 
History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1984); Tushnet, 
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. 
REv. 781 (1983). 
11. Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); see 
also Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988); Priest, Selectfre 
Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1980); Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the 
Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717 (1988). 
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the case must be governed by the rule. Here I maintain that no real 
"interpretation" of the rule is taking place. [p. 74] 
None of this is crystal clear in the book, and interpretations other 
than my own are plausible. Still, much of this strikes me as making 
the essentially positivist (in Dworkin's sense12) claim that there is a 
body of doctrine called "the rules of law," that those rules have cen-
ters and peripheries that largely track the centers and peripheries of 
the meaning of their component linguistic parts, and that cases lying 
within the centers are such that competent lawyers recognize them as 
such; the consequence being that such cases are rarely disputed and 
even more rarely appealed to courts of last resort. As a result, the 
cases that are so disputed and appealed are the skewed sample of cases 
lying on the peripheries of the legal rules, such peripheries being them-
selves determined by recourse to linguistic meaning and little else. 
The remarkable modesty of this claim becomes apparent upon con-
sideration of an alternative explanation for the selection hypothesis. 
Suppose the legal system were such that the rules of law were taken 
merely as transparent probabilistic guides (rules of thumb) to morally 
correct results. In such a system it would be legitimate for a legal 
decisionmaker, such as a judge, to disregard a legal rule even within 
the center of its linguistic extension when application of that rule to 
some case would produce a morally incorrect result. Were that the 
case, even competent lawyers would have reason to create a dispute, 
bring a case to trial, or appeal an unfavorable result whenever they felt 
they could maintain a plausible argument for moral correctness, even 
if the plain linguistic meaning of a plainly applicable legal rule inclined 
in exactly the opposite direction. This is not, however, to deny the 
operation of the selection hypothesis. Even were moral correctness a 
winning legal argument it would still be true that only those cases in 
which two competent lawyers felt somewhat confident in advancing 
opposing positions would be disputed, tried, or appealed. But the ar-
ray of cases so selected, although still unrepresentative of all legal 
12. I append the parenthetical to note that I am referring here to positivism in the sense of a 
limited and pedigreeable set of materials extensionally divergent from a society's totality of ac-
cepted social norms. This is the sense of positivism that Dworkin attacks in R. DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-130 (1977), and R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986), and that 
others defend. See R. GA VISON, Comment, in ISSUES IN CoNTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: 
THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 21 (R. Gavison ed. 1987); J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 
37-121 (1979). For quite contrasting approaches to what positivism is all about, approaches 
rejecting the centrality of the "limited domain" idea, see J. COLEMAN, Negative and Positive 
Positivism, in MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 3 (1988); Lyons, Principles, Positivism, and 
Legal Theory (Book Review), 87 YALE L.J. 415 (1977); Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation 
of the Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 15 MICH. L. REv. 473 (1977). The debate continues. 
Compare Postema, Positivism, I Presume? . • • Comments on Schauer's "Rules and the Rule of 
Law," 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. (forthcoming 1991) and Schauer, Rules and the Rule of 
Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. (forthcoming 1991) with Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. (forthcoming 1991). 
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events, would be different, now representing an array of cases of moral 
doubt rather than of linguistic doubt. 
Most readers will recognize this picture as similar to Dworkin's 
picture of the legal system. And if we substitute "social" for "moral" 
we come closer to Eisenberg's account of the nature of the common 
law. 13 Other variants could be added as well. But the point I wish to 
make here is that even if Llewellyn is right about the concentration of 
hard cases in appellate courts, and about the consequent fallacy of 
generalizing from those "borderline" cases to the operation and effect 
oflaw in society at large (p. 1), little about the nature oflegal decision-
making follows from this premise. Llewellyn appears to think that the 
chief distinction between hard cases and easy ones derives from their 
linguistic/doctrinal extension, hardly a radical and hardly a Realist 
conclusion, and one diverging substantially from the picture that one 
would get from reading Frank or others similarly inclined. 
That Llewellyn is a "conservative" on this aspect of legal theory 
does not necessarily make him wrong. Indeed, if (as he himself sug-
gests) we take his view of doctrinal dominance as presumptive rather 
than conclusive, his conclusions strike me as largely correct. 14 Yet in 
terms of many enduring debates about the nature of legal decision-
making, it is nonetheless true that Llewellyn's comparatively narrow 
view of the determinants of legal doubt hardly puts him in the fore-
front of extreme challenges to traditional understandings of how the 
law operates. 
Llewellyn's doubts are limited in a quite different sense as well. 
Although he occasionally acknowledges the cultural contingency of 
the various stabilizing factors that his work is noted for identifying (p. 
10), Llewellyn just as often transmits the message of inevitability, such 
as when he claims that the gravitation toward moderately strong prec-
edential constraint is the natural course of all lawyers and all legal 
systems (pp. 48-49). Surely to describe as both inevitable and inevita-
bly desirable the control by the past that is necessarily part of any 
system that takes precedent seriously requires far more showing than 
we get here or anywhere else in Llewellyn's work. Llewellyn's posi-
tion presupposes views about either the desirability of an existing state 
of affairs or the desirability of stability for stability's sake that can 
hardly be called necessary or universal. 15 This is not to deny that 
some states of affairs may be worth entrenching, nor that stability for 
stability's sake might sometimes be desirable. When such goals are 
sought, a system of precedent is often a valuable instrument. But at 
certain times and in certain places there can be reasonable doubts 
13. M. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988). 
14. See Schauer, Formalism, 91 YALE L.J. 509, 544-48 (1988). 
15. See Alexander, Constrained By Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989); Schauer, Prece· 
dent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). 
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about whether to entrench a state of affairs and about the value of 
stability for stability's sake, 16 doubts that Llewellyn rarely seems to 
express. 
In similar fashion, Llewellyn rarely expresses doubts about the 
choices that are built into the constraining factors he properly identi-
fies. His faith in judges (if only they become self-aware), in the bar, 
and in the legal institutions providing the constraints is largely un-
clouded by doubts about the choices built into these constraints. He is 
rarely critical, for example, of the process of selecting lawyers whose 
uniform training and acculturation provides one of his stabilizing fac-
tors, nor of an adversary system of decisionmaking whose special style 
dampens potential diversity of decisions. Nor is Llewellyn's faith 
tested by the consideration of alternative arrangements that might 
provide equally constraining but substantively different constraint. 
Just as he appears relatively confident that doctrinal and linguistic un-
certainty is the major source of legal uncertainty, so too does heap-
pear equally confident that the sources of legal certainty are as fixed a 
part of the social landscape as are the rules of language. What 
emerges from this book, therefore, is an impression, at least partly at-
tributable to what happens to most of us when we are called upon to 
explain our own system in other countries, 17 of a Llewellyn both far 
more committed to the existence of legal determinacy and far more 
uncritically appreciative of its sources than the standard picture either 
of Llewellyn or of Realism in general would have led many to expect. 
Realism is as much a part of the American legal landscape as it is 
widely misunderstood, and much the same can be said of Llewellyn. 
In light of that, this sensitively translated and edited work, now acces-
sible partly because of its brevity but mostly because of the skill of 
those who have brought it to us, should be required reading for those 
who seek to understand the development of American legal thought 
and the operation of the common law in appellate courts. None of my 
skepticism about Llewellyn's message applies at all to the enterprise of 
making it available. 
16. See Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good? (Book Review), 86 YALE 
L.J. 561 (1977). 
17. However much we may criticize or be skeptical of our own systems when we are home, 
explaining those systems abroad often brings out defenses and justifications that would otherwise 
seem embarrassing. 
